UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION

FIMBANK PLC,) CASE NO: 2:19-CV-00264
Plaintiff,) CIVIL
vs.) Corpus Christi, Texas
DISCOVER INVESTMENT CORP, ET AL,) Wednesday, November 13, 2019
) (2:47 p.m. to 4:17 p.m.)
Defendants.	_) (4:32 p.m. to 4:57 p.m.)

HEARING

BEFORE THE HONORABLE B. JANICE ELLINGTON,
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

APPEARANCES: See page 2

Court Reporter: Recorded; FTR

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P.O. Box 8365

Corpus Christi, TX 78468

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APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff: ANDREW R. NASH, ESQ.

Phelps Dunbar

500 Dallas, Suite 1300

Houston, TX 77002

EDWARD W. FLOYD, ESQ.

Floyd Zadkovich

215 Park Ave. South, 11th Floor

New York, NY 10003

ANDREW NASH, ESQ.

Phelps Dunbar

500 Dallas St., Suite 1300

Houston, TX 77002

For Defendants: JAMES F. BUCHANAN, ESQ.

Welder Leshin

800 N. Shoreline Blvd. Suite 300 North Tower Corpus Christi, TX 78401

MICHAEL J. WRAY, ESQ. CHRISTOPHER R. HART, ESQ. Holman Fenwick Willan

5151 San Felipe, Suite 400 Houston, TX 77056

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 1
              THE COURT: And then, mister --
 2
              MR. BUCHANAN: Mr. Hart and Mr. Wray will both be
 3
    arguing on behalf of SPV SAM Eagle.
 4
              THE COURT: Okay, and Mr. Nork, you mean?
 5
              And who's arguing on -- I'm sorry. Who's arguing on
    behalf of the Defendant?
 6
 7
              MR. WRAY: Your Honor, this is Michael Wray. Myself
 8
    and Mr. Hart will be splitting the argument.
 9
              THE COURT: Oh, okay. It's the Ray; W-r-a-y?
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              MR. WRAY: Yes, your Honor.
11
              THE COURT: Okay. All right, sorry. You can be
12
    seated. Thank you.
13
              All right. So I guess everybody agrees that the
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    burden is going to be on the Plaintiff in this hearing?
              MR. FLOYD: Yes, your Honor.
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16
              THE COURT: Okay, but it's the Defense motion.
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              But let me hear from the Defense, first, on the
18
    motions, and then we'll hear from the Plaintiff.
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              MR. WRAY:
                         Thank you, your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Mr. Wray?
              MR. WRAY: Good afternoon, your Honor. Michael Wray
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22
    on behalf of Defendant SPV SAM Eagle.
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              In this argument, I'm going to handle the
24
    introduction, I want to address the burden of proof and the
25
    mis-delivery claim.
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              THE COURT: -- to understand this.
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                         So the -- first of all, it is a maritime
              MR. NASH:
    claim.
 3
              Second of all, the vessel that is attached, the M/V
 4
 5
    Sam Eagle --
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              THE COURT: But it was never the NIKA?
 7
              MR. NASH: That is correct.
              THE COURT: That's right. Okay, so that was the
 8
 9
    whole point.
10
              It wasn't the NIKA and it wasn't proceeding -- I
    understand what you mean about being a maritime claim. But it
11
12
    was never an attempt to say the NIKA was the Sam Eagle, right?
13
              Okay, so I just want to understand. Go ahead.
14
              Thank you. You may be seated.
15
              Go ahead, Mr. Wray.
16
              MR. WRAY: And, your Honor, I think you seized a very
17
    important point.
18
              These are separate vessels owned by separate and
19
    distinct companies.
20
              Now, as your Honor mentioned earlier, it is -- this
    is a show cause hearing, under Rule (E)(4)(f). The Plaintiff
21
22
    has the burden of proof -- in this case, FIMBank -- that they
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    had to come forth with competent evidence that there are
24
    reasonable grounds to maintain the attachment.
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              This is more than just a notice-pleading standard
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under Rule 8. So what they have to show today -- as we sit
here today, the evidence in the record -- that they are legally
entitled to maintain this attachment.
          Now, Rule (b) is strictly construed, because it
deprives people of their property.
          In this case, the vessel Sam Eagle has been -- the
owners have been deprived of property for over two months.
          So the reasonable ground standards is that it's more
likely than not that the alleged facts are true. It's a
heightened pleading standard, which we don't think they can
meet today.
          Now, what hurdles does FIMBank have to overcome
today?
          Well, Rule B itself -- which they proceeded under --
requires a very -- a maritime claim supported by a verified
pleading.
          In this case, the maritime claim they've identified
is the alleged mis-delivery of cargo, carried by the NIKA, in
2018, in Egypt. That's the first hurdle.
          The second hurdle is, under this Circuit's case law,
they have to show that the Sam Eagle -- sitting here in Corpus
Christi Bay -- is the property of Discover Investment.
         Now, the way they have alleged it, at least
initially, was that there was a company called, "SAM Geneva,
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slash, SAM Panama, "dominating control of Discover and, in

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1 turn, dominating and controlled SPV SAM Eagle.
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So they have a double veil-piercing standard to show that the property, here in Texas, is actually Discover

4 Investments' property.

So, first thing, all -- if they have to meet their alter ego factors -- and those alter ego factors must have existed at the time of the underlying grain carriage, in 2018.

And the second legal requirement in a veil-piercing hearing -- analysis, in this Circuit, is that the corporate form must have been used to commit a fraud or wrongdoing or injustice at the time of the underlying transaction

Now, that's quite a few hurdles they have to come through. And what have -- what evidence have they actually brought forward to this Court?

Well, their initial verification, executed by FIMBank's general Counsel, an interested witness -- admits that half the facts in the petition were upon information and belief and they lacked personal knowledge, particularly dealing with the veil-piercing allegations.

They put in a declaration, from their trial Counsel, summarizing a conversation he had with a SAM Geneva employee, who left in 2014, four years before the transaction of issue -- which is nothing but hearsay.

And they put copious amounts of pronouncing theories of maritime databases, particularly Equasis. What I find

- 10 1 interesting about those databases is they all have disclaimers. 2 The information here is not reliable. They disclaim responsibility for it and it shouldn't be used. 3 So one of the -- as an example -- this is on Equasis' 4 5 website, which I looked at this morning. They refer to data 6 from the IHS maritime. And the disclaimer for that company is, 7 "IHS data must never be used for commercial purposes or to produce a commercial product or service." 8 9 So they have hearsay upon hearsay. Google pronounce 10 and the declaration of a ship broker has no personal knowledge 11 of any of the transactions. 12 So given the standard of the burden of proof they 13 have today and the evidence they've -- we think our briefing 14 more than shows that evidence is incompetent to maintain their 15 burden. 16 Now, turning to the mis-delivery claim, (indisc.) 17 procedural mechanism. The Fifth Circuit, in the Alphamate 18 decision, clearly identifying that to support a marine 19 attachment, you have to have an underlying maritime claim. 20 And without a valid maritime claim, there cannot be 21 an attachment. In other words, what maritime contract today 22 has a FIMBank (indisc.)? 23 Well, they weren't the charterers of the NIKA; they 24 weren't the shippers of the cargo; they weren't the consignee
- 25 of the cargo.

1 What FIMBank has identified is that they were holders 2 of a bill of lading for this grain. And they held it as security for the loan they made to AOS. 3 Now, the simple fact of being a holder of a 4 5 negotiable instrument -- in this case, the bill of lading served as a title document, because these were two order bills. 6 7 Two order bills was, anybody who had a copy of that two order bill could go to the warehouse in Egypt and request 8 the cargo. 10 So while they talked about, "We have these bills of lading; we had the bills of lading," they never say what the 11 12 ship did wrong in Egypt. 13 They state it's their position the cargo was mis-14 delivered, but there was no facts alleged in the complaint that 15 says how, to who, what happened to this cargo, or how did the 16 vessel tender the cargo to somebody who is not lawfully 17 entitled to receive it. 18 In fact, the law actually requires that the vessel 19 owner tender the cargo to a holder of an order bill. 20 And that's supported by (indisc.) partners case, cited in our brief. 21 22 So what information have they put forth in the record 23 to support the mis-delivery claim? 24 FIMBank had original bills of lading. FIMBank then 25 transmitted those original bills of lading to a bank in Egypt,

- 12 1 called, "BLOM Bank," which then asked BLOM Bank not to release 2 the bills of lading until FIMBank got paid. So by tendering those bills of lading, they've 3 released their security interest. And if BLOM Bank didn't do 4 5 their job and gave those bills of lading to third parties in 6 Egypt to collect the cargo, that's an issue between BLOM Bank 7 and FIMBank; it's between FIMBank and AOS. Has nothing to do 8 with the ship. 9 So we think a glaring omission from their complaint 10 is, when did the ship do wrong? 11 Others going to say, it's our position it was mis-12 delivered. Well, that's a legal conclusion. It's our position 13 that the attachment shouldn't be -- should be vacated. But the 14 Court has to look at the pleadings and the evidence to make 15 that determination. So, in short, we think that the first hurdle that 16 17 there's a valid maritime claim for mis-delivery fails. And 18 without that, the whole house of cards collapses. 19 And with that point, your Honor, I'll turn now to my 20 colleague Mr. Hart, who will address the alter ego factors. 21 THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Hart? 22 Thank you, your Honor. MR. WRAY: 23 MR. FLOYD: Your Honor, may I ask, just in the 24
 - interest of simplicity, if I could address those parts now? It just may move things along and keep things orderly.

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              THE COURT:
                           Well, all right. I'll give you a chance.
 2
              We'll see.
                           I just want to -- I was -- I need to
    understand all of this.
 3
 4
              MR. FLOYD:
                          Understood, your Honor. Thank you.
 5
              THE COURT:
                          All right, why don't you go ahead --
                          Thank you, your Honor.
 6
              MR. FLOYD:
 7
                           -- Mr. Floyd.
              THE COURT:
                          I may not go in the same order as my
 8
              MR. FLOYD:
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    adversary did there. But there were a number of points that he
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    raised that I just thought should be addressed at the outset
11
    here.
12
              First of all, regarding the nature of Rule B in the
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    requirements for obtaining a Rule B attachment, I don't think
    that there's any dispute regarding the law on that.
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15
              There's four prongs or four elements to the analysis.
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              First, that the Plaintiff has alleged a prima facie
17
    valid maritime claim; second, that the Defendant or Defendants
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    cannot be found within the Federal District; third, that the
19
    Defendan, or Defendants' property can be found here; and,
20
    fourth, that there are no statutory or maritime law bars to the
21
    attachment.
22
              My understanding of the motion is that the only prong
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    that's being challenged here today is the first one; whether or
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    not the Plaintiff has asserted alleged a prima facie valid
25
    maritime claim.
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And that's being attacked on two grounds -- or two angles; the first being the underlying dispute, and the second one being the alter ego allegations. For point of clarification, when I say, "underlying dispute, " what I'm referring to there is the underlying dispute between FIMBank, as the holder in due course of original bills of lading, and the owner of the NORD -- which is the vessel's name now; formally known as the ex-NIKA, which is what it was called as of early 2018, when this voyage was performed, carrying wheat from Russia to Egypt. That underlying dispute concerns a claim for misdelivery of cargo. That claim is already subject to arbitration in England, pursuant to an arbitration agreement. There's some dispute over there as to which contract governs the precise terms in the body of arbitration, as I understand it. But --THE COURT: Let me just stop you for just a minute. Was Counsel correct when he said that -- what I want to know is, is there a case -- if you're disputing whether or not there's a maritime claim, I don't think anybody's disputing that the claim against the NIKA, that's in arbitration -- no one's claiming that's not a maritime claim; is that right? MR. WRAY: Your Honor, the claim in arbitration against the NICA is in Europe.

Okay, so if the claim in

Okay.

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alter ego argument?

- arbitration is a maritime claim and -- so what I need is not the facts of the case.

 What I really need from you is a case that says that that kind of a dispute can be used to -- as the basis for a maritime attachment. Now, does that then go strictly to the
 - MR. WRAY: If I may, my colleague (indisc.). A maritime -- they have to put forth a valid maritime claim, initially, to support a moving attachment here in the U.S.
- 11 MR. WRAY: Alphamate, the case that directs that
 12 specifically with the Court -- what was at issue?

THE COURT: Right, right.

14 That was also a grain or commodities trading contract that had
15 a vessel involved.

Was it a maritime claim or was it not a maritime.

- And the Fifth Circuit said, "No, given the facts of that case, there was no maritime claim." So, therefore, the attachment fell through.
- We do not see it here today. They've articulated a valid maritime claim purely based on (indisc.) as a holder of a bill of lading.
- 22 MR. FLOYD: But Alphamate -- it's been a while since 23 I've read the case.
- 24 **THE COURT:** Okay.
- 25 MR. FLOYD: I've read a number of times.

- 1 THE COURT: Okay, go ahead, mister --
- 2 MR. FLOYD: Alphamate was a claim arising from a
- 3 | sales contract -- purchase and sales contract.
- 4 And the issue there was whether -- or whether it was
- 5 on FOB terms or CIF terms -- whether a sale contract that
- 6 | contains some maritime terms in it, such as "demurrage" or who
- 7 pays for the shipping, et cetera -- whether that can arise to
- 8 being a maritime contract.
- 9 And the Fifth Circuit held, in Alphamate, that a sale
- 10 | contract is not a shipping contract and is not a maritime
- 11 | contract. However, that has absolutely nothing to do with a
- 12 | bill of lading.
- A bill of lading is most certainly -- depending upon
- 14 | who holds it, a bill of lading is a maritime contract.
- Bills of lading -- and I think it's pretty
- 16 axiomatic -- served several purposes. One, they're a document
- 17 of title; one, they're a receipt of the goods by the ship; and
- 18 the third one, when a bill of lading is held by somebody who is
- 19 | not the charterer of the vessel, then in their hands, that bill
- 20 of lading is the contract of carriage.
- 21 In this situation here, the bill of lading went to --
- 22 actually, the 61 bills of lading; and about 20-some of those
- 23 are at issue.
- 24 The bills of lading went to FIMBank. FIMBank held
- 25 them as a holder in due course because it was financing the

underlying trade.

FIMBank sent those bills of lading on out for collection, as it's termed in the industry, meaning that the bills of lading are used to receive payment, and the person who makes payment for the cargo represented by the bill then goes and gets the cargo.

In this situation, the bills of lading went on out for collection. Then BLOM Bank -- or BLOM Bank sent those bills -- a number of them -- back to FIMBank and said, "Sorry," basically. "Cargo's gone, but here's the bills. We didn't get paid, and you're not getting paid."

That's a mis-delivery claim there. Something happened to that cargo that it was allowed to go forth without proper presentation of the original bills of lading. But all of that is subject to arbitration in London.

The sole point here that matters is that there were bills of lading, bills of lading constitute maritime contracts and the claim or the underlying disputes of the arbitration in London, and London Maritime Arbitration Association rules is a maritime claim.

We then shift from clearly having an underlying maritime claim on over to the true issue here, which are -- is the alter ego allegations. That's what's really at issue here.

And there's hundreds of cases -- and I've been involved in a good number of them -- recognizing, of course,

- 1 | that if an underlying dispute constitutes maritime dispute,
- 2 | falls within the scope of the Court's maritime jurisdiction,
- 3 then a claim to enforce that, based upon an alter ego theory of
- 4 liability, also falls within the Court's maritime jurisdiction
- 5 and suffices for purposes of the first prong of Rule B; that
- 6 prong being whether the Plaintiff has set forth a prima facie
- 7 | valid maritime claim.
- On that, mister -- my adversary made some assertions regarding the burden of proof. We are not arguing against the
- 10 fact that those four prongs, initially, at least, fall on the
- 11 Plaintiff to properly allege.
- 12 However, there was an assertion made that
- 13 evidence, and fully admissible evidence, needs to be presented
- 14 at this early stage regarding an alter ego claim and
- 15 demonstrating, by a preponderance, that the alter ego claim is
- 16 more likely than not to succeed.
- I do not agree that that is correct. One case cited
- 18 | in our opposition memo would be the White Rosebay decision by
- 19 Judge Ramos, which, quite specifically, held that all that is
- 20 required at this early stage is that the allegations in the
- 21 | complaint, together with documents and materials submitted in
- 22 | connection with the so-called Rule 4(e), (4)(f) motion
- 23 | practice -- which is what we're at right now -- can justify or
- 24 | is sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the alter
- 25 ego allegations are valid and might succeed.

I'm sure we'll get to it later on here regarding those allegations and the supporting materials, but we're looking for, solely, a reasonable inference at this point.

To say and suggest that FIMBank has to come forward with conclusive evidence at this point to definitively resolve the dispute is precisely contrary to the decision in White Rosebay; in fact, that was expressly rejected in that decision.

Instead, it's sufficient information to support a reasonable belief. And what will ordinarily occur thereafter is that because Rule B is inherently a jurisdictional tool -- jurisdiction device for establishing quasi in rem personal jurisdiction over one or more Defendants.

And of course -- and oftentimes said -- and, again, these decisions are cited in our brief -- that, early in a case, disputed allegations of personal jurisdiction can be a bit hazy or fuzzy. It warrants discovery.

And to the extent the Court has any doubts regarding the validity and the strength of the allegations to date, I would strongly propose that expedited -- and certainly expedited -- but expedited discovery would be fully appropriate in these circumstances.

In my mind, where I think that that would be is expedited discovery concerning the ultimate ownership of each of these companies.

I'm pretty certain I know who is the ultimate

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    beneficial owner. And that that would be the same UBO or
 2
    ultimate beneficial owner identified as a UBO in some of the
 3
    mortgage documents that we've submitted, a Ms. Irina Pomelova,
    of Moscow, who owns these companies via a series of offshore
 4
 5
    companies out of Hong Kong, and then in Panama and elsewhere,
    including Liberia.
 6
 7
              But discovery regarding ownership; discovery
    regarding the insurance -- because as pointed out, in our
 8
 9
    papers, there's this very shockingly unique situation where
10
    Steamship Mutual P&I Club issued sequential renewal notices --
11
    renewal numbers two years in a row for each of the ships,
12
    including the NIKA and including the SAM -- which we say all
13
    fall within --
14
              MR. WRAY: Your Honor --
15
              MR. FLOYD: -- the same ownership fleet.
16
              THE COURT:
                         Yes, sir?
17
              MR. FLOYD: I'm good.
18
              MR. WRAY: Mis-delivery plan -- we're just going to
19
    the (indisc.).
20
              MR. FLOYD: I'm good now, sir. You can step up
21
    there.
22
              THE COURT: This was a bad idea.
23
              Okay, Mr. Hart, are you going to address alter ego?
24
              MR. WRAY: Yes, ma'am. I'd like to make one rebuttal
25
    point and (indisc.) so we can close that off.
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But how is the Plaintiff supposed to be able to get
that information unless they have a short period of discovery
where they can try to take depositions and do all those other
things that they do?
                     They've actually already come forward with
their information, your Honor. And today is the day, at this
hearing, that Rule (E)(4)(f) says that the proponent of the
attachment has the burden to show why the attachment should not
be vacated.
          And the reason why the --
          THE COURT:
                     No. You've not conducted any discovery
at this point.
          MR. HART: And that's why this is -- Rule B is such
an exceptional remedy, your Honor. Because it deprives my
client --
          THE COURT: I understand that.
          MR. HART: -- of property.
          THE COURT: I understand that. I'm talking about --
                    It's an exceptional --
          MR. HART:
          THE COURT: -- expedited discovery.
          I'm not talking about letting some period of time
pass while the parties are exchanging preliminary motions.
          MR. HART: Understand, your Honor.
          In the event that expedited discovery is allowed here
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and goes forward, we would ask that the Court not even

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    entertain that idea, unless the Court also requires FIMBank to
 2
    deposit money to cover the custodial expenses for keeping the
    vessel under attachment.
 3
              The vessel's already been deprived, from SPV SAM
 4
 5
    Eagle, for two months. It's already been here for two months.
 6
    And quite a bit of custodial expenses have already been
 7
    incurred by the vessel.
              If FIMBank wants more time to conduct a discovery
 9
    fishing expedition to try to find out what if they might
10
    discover some alter eqo facts --
11
              THE COURT: I'm not going to do that.
12
              MR. HART: -- then they should be entitled.
13
              THE COURT: I'm not going to do that.
14
              You can appeal and go to Judge Ramos. But the
15
    Plaintiff -- I mean, the real issue is, why didn't you reduce
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    those costs by posting a bond that you would get back if there
17
    was no showing of alter ego?
18
              MR. HART: Well, here, your Honor, the problem is
19
    that the owner of the property is not required to post a bond.
20
              And here, that's all their asking for. What they're
21
    asking for is a bond to secure --
22
              THE COURT: Right.
23
              MR. HART: -- what they hope to be payment,
24
    eventually.
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And they have to make a --

Right.

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24
 1
              MR. HART:
                         That's all they're --
 2
              THE COURT: -- preliminary --
 3
              MR. HART: -- asking for.
              THE COURT:
                          -- showing of that. And that's why we're
 4
 5
    having this hearing.
              And that's why I'm asking, why can't we have a period
 6
    of discovery for that?
 7
              MR. HART: We would ask the Court not to grant them
 8
    time for a period of discovery because today --
10
              Because, today, what I'm about to explain is why the
11
    facts that they have alleged and the evidence that they have
12
    brought forward is insufficient for anybody to draw a
13
    reasonable inference that they could be successful on proving
14
    their alter ego allegations and piercing the corporate veil.
15
              What they have alleged is not sufficient.
16
              THE COURT: Okay, well why don't you go ahead and
17
    make your argument, Mr. Hart.
18
              MR. HART:
                         Thank you, your Honor.
19
              What I'm going to do is address the alter ego factors
20
    that the Fifth Circuit and the Courts -- District Courts, here,
21
    within the Fifth Circuit have applied to these maritime alter
    ego cases.
22
23
              As the Court is well aware, this is not the first
    time a Plaintiff has tried to attach somebody else's property
24
25
    under an alter ego theory.
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- 1 which is the vessel that carried the grain and delivered it in
- 2 | Egypt -- which is the vessel that's the subject of what FIMBank
- 3 calls its underlying dispute.
- 4 THE COURT: I understand. The SAM Eagle's the thing
- 5 | that's here.
- 6 MR. HART: SAM Eagle's the other ship.
- 7 THE COURT: Nobody's disputing that they're different
- 8 vessels.
- 9 MR. HART: Understand.
- 10 They also have different owners, your Honor; the
- 11 | corporations that own them are different. And the ultimate
- 12 owners are also different sole private investors.
- 13 | Counsel just alleged, in his argument, that he seems
- 14 to think that the ultimate beneficial owners of each vessels is
- 15 Ms. Irina Pomelova. I think that's what he just said.
- 16 Mr. Saevski's declaration demonstrates and proves
- 17 | that that is false.
- 18 | THE COURT: Well, I know. But where are the
- 19 documents to support that?
- 20 Doesn't he have the right to get the documents to
- 21 | support what's in the declaration?
- 22 MR. HART: I think he does not, your Honor, without
- 23 more evidence to support any of these alter ego allegations.
- 24 THE COURT: Okay, so your point is, he just doesn't
- 25 have the right?

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1
              MR. HART:
                         That's right. Because they can't meet any
 2
    other factors on alter eqo allegations, your Honor
 3
              THE COURT: Okay.
 4
                         They've got lots of evidence.
              MR. HART:
 5
              In fact, this entire notebook -- you know, is a
 6
    copy -- as the Court's seen, there are many exhibits in their
 7
    response.
              And they've got lots of papers, lots of argument --
 9
    and very confusing argument in their complaint and their
10
    response and lots of papers.
11
              But what I would like to do is to show the Court that
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    all those papers and all those arguments, they do not meet --
13
    they do not raise a reasonable inference of virtually any of
14
    these --
15
              THE COURT: I hate to tell you this, but --
16
              MR. HART: -- alter ego factors.
17
              THE COURT: -- I cannot read those. You're going to
18
    have to bring it up closer.
                                  I'm old.
19
              MR. HART:
                        (Indisc.).
20
              THE COURT: Okay, I can see it now.
21
              MR. HART:
                         So this is a summary. That's why there's
22
    so many. Because there are 19 factors from the Fifth Circuit
23
    cases that are the guidelines for Courts to consider in
24
    deciding whether evidence is sufficient to meet an alter ego
25
    veil-piercing theory.
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1
              So we've listed all 19 of them here to help me
 2
    remember what they are, to go through them. And they're also
 3
    listed in our reply brief, your Honor. And what I'd like to do
 4
    is point out why their evidence really does not even raise a
 5
    reasonable inference of --
 6
              THE COURT: Okay, wait. Just a minute.
 7
              MR. HART: -- of success on these factors.
              THE COURT: Let me ask.
 8
 9
              Mr. Floyd, is it your position -- do you agree to the
10
         Do you agree about the law of alter ego?
    law?
11
              MR. FLOYD: In general, your Honor.
              THE COURT: I'm not talking about the facts; I'm
12
13
    talking about the law.
14
              MR. FLOYD: Talking about the law of the factors that
15
    they've identified are consistent with the factors that Courts
16
    have, across the country and also within the Fifth Circuit,
17
    most importantly, identified.
18
              However, they're always identified as being non-
19
    exclusive factors and also identified in connection --
20
              THE COURT: Okay, but --
21
              MR. FLOYD: -- with the proposition --
22
              THE COURT:
                         Okay.
23
              MR. FLOYD:
                         -- not entered.
24
              THE COURT: I understand that. But is it -- and it's
25
    your -- is it your position that you don't have that all -- any
```

of those things and you need discovery to get it?

MR. FLOYD: Oh, no, your Honor. We certainly have the allegations and documents to support a good amount of that.

But what I'd like to get discovery on is a number of things. But say, for one, the demonstrative exhibit over here that has at the top of each chain, sole private investor, on two different sides there -- and Mr. Hart -- correct? Sorry.

MR. HART: Yes, Counsel.

MR. FLOYD: Thank you.

-- has said that, you know, "that's not Ms. Pomelova who sits at the top there."

I realize that. I see, in Mr. Saevski's declaration that he very conveniently refers to a sole investor being a person. And persons, in my mind, constitute -- cover both individuals and artificial entities.

And quite certain that -- you know, one thing that we'd like to look for in discovery is at the top of that chain there, the two sole private investors, who are they? And who is the UBO -- the ultimate beneficial owner? That's the real question.

When -- we're not talking here about any publicly traded companies where people like me might have a share or two. We're talking about privately-held companies, where there's going to be one, maybe two, family members sitting at the top, who own everything.

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1
              And that's who the ultimate beneficial owner is going
 2
           And what we'd like to see is that chart over there
 3
    coming together with a little teepee at the top to show --
 4
              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
 5
              MR. FLOYD:
                          -- the name.
 6
              THE COURT: Okay, thank you.
 7
              I want all of the parties to keep note about, if I do
 8
    order discovery at the end of this, what exactly discover --
 9
    what discovery is going to be allowed? Okay?
10
              Now, you may continue, Mr. Hart.
11
              MR. HART:
                         Your Honor, I'd like to point out that
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    what Counsel just asserted is nothing but pure speculation.
13
              THE COURT: Okay, but don't use those words, please.
14
    Just tell me what your proof is.
15
              MR. HART: For the guidelines that the Fifth Circuit
16
    says --
17
              THE COURT: Everybody agrees.
18
              MR. HART: -- to consider --
19
              THE COURT: -- those are the guidelines.
20
                          "Is there a common stock ownership between
              MR. HART:
21
    the two owners of these two vessels?"
22
              There is no evidence of that, your Honor. There's no
23
    evidence or argument that the stock of SPV SAM Eagle -- the
24
    stock owner of SPV SAM Eagle, Inc. is in common with any stock
25
    holder of Discover Investment Corp.
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1 In fact, just the opposite is true, based on that declaration. So this first regarding factor, the answer is, "No, 3 there is no evidence of that factor." 4 5 "Do the parent and subsidiary have common directors or officers?" 6 7 "The answer again is, "No." The allegations and the evidence that FIMBank has put forward do not establish that. They have pointed out that they 10 have identified that some of the SAM entities have directors 11 who are Panamanian persons in Panama. 12 But there's absolutely no evidence of any overlap of 13 those directors with Discover Investment Corp. 14 So that is not any evidence that would support a 15 reasonable inference that there are common officers and directors between Discover Investment Corp. and SPV SAM Eagle, 16 17 or even this SAM Geneva or SAM Panama entity. 18 It's simply not. They -- all it does is show the identities of directors of a few Panamanian entities. 19 20 So there's no evidence here to raise a reasonable 21 inference on Factor Number Three. 22 Number Four asks, "Do the companies, the parent, and the subsidiary file consolidated financial statements?" 23 24 If that answer is, "No." 25 FIMBank has no evidence and no -- not even an

32 1 allegation that there are -- of that factor. 2 "Does the parent finance the subsidiary?" There's no direct evidence of that at all. In fact, 3 the evidence that FIMBank has produced in their response proves 4 5 just the opposite. 6 There, among their documents, are ship mortgages, 7 which Counsel has referred to here. And there are several ship mortgages for some of these SAM vessels. 8 9 But what that is evidence of is a bank. It's an 10 arm's length trans -- loan transaction with a bank. Their ship 11 mortgage is given by the Credit Suisse Bank. 12 So that just proves just the opposite. It's not any 13 parents financing a subsidiary; it's a bank financing the 14 purchase of these vessels. So the answer -- on that factor, there truly is no 15 16 evidence that could raise a reasonable inference of the 17 existence of that factor of piercing the corporate veil. 18 "Did the parent cause the incorporation of the 19 subsidiary?" 20 There's no allegation in the complaint about that or 21 the response or evidence. So the answer is, "No," on that factor. 22 23 "Is the subsidiary operating with grossly inadequate 24 capital?"

And I discern no

Here, FIMBank has no evidence.

1 argument or allegation about grossly inadequate capitalization of either of these entities. 2 3 The next factor down here says, "Does the parent pay salaries and expenses of the subsidiary?" 4 5 There's no evidence or even an allegation of that factor either. 6 7 Factor Number Nine asks, "Does the subsidiary receive no business except that given by the parent?" 8 9 Here, I'd say again, there's no direct evidence of 10 that, but there's lots of innuendo and insinuation in FIMBank's 11 argument that, because the two ships -- the SAM Eagle and the 12 NIKA -- both have the same commercial ship manager, that, 13 therefore, they receive all their business from that commercial 14 manager. 15 But there's significant problem with that, from FIMBank's perspective. And this -- I'd like to explain why 16 17 that is not evidence that raises a reasonable inference of any of these alter ego factors. 18 19 And that's because the -- there's no crime and 20 there's nothing nefarious about having a contract with a 21 commercial ship manager. 22 Instead, it's very common. In fact, it's so common 23 that there are form contracts for these commercial ship 24 management contracts.

We have introduced in our -- or we've attached, in

- 1 our reply brief, copies of the ship management contracts.
- 2 | They're there, attached to Mr. Saevski's declaration.
- And so there is evidence now of the ship management
- 4 | contract between SPV SAM Eagle and this entity called SAM
- 5 Panama -- of course, the entity called SAM Panama to manage the
- 6 SAM Eagle.
- 7 And there's another copy of a separate contract
- 8 | between Discover Investment Corp. and SAM Panama -- it's the
- 9 same company -- to manage the M/V NICA.
- 10 What that is, is evidence of an arm's length
- 11 transaction to enter into a commercial management agreement.
- 12 They are entered into by two separate corporate
- 13 | entities. What that does is demonstrate corporate
- 14 separateness.
- 15 It demonstrates that these corporations are observing
- 16 corporate formalities. It demonstrates that SAM Panama is
- 17 | certainly not dominating and controlling either of the other
- 18 | entities; in fact, just the opposite is true.
- 19 The entities that owned the vessels contracted for
- 20 SAM Panama -- for SAM Panama to provide the services. And so
- 21 | those owner-entities pay a fee to SAM Panama to commercially
- 22 manage the vessels.
- 23 What the commercial manager is required to do, by its
- 24 | contract, is written right into the shipman form contracts that
- 25 are in evidence.

1 They're actually in their file as Document Number 2 27 -- 27-3. They're all in 27-3; they're Exhibits B, C, and D, to Dennis Saevski's declaration. 3 I'd like to point out to the Court that there 4 5 absolutely is nothing nefarious about a ship -- commercial ship manager managing several ships owned by several different 6 7 companies. It is so common, that there's a form contract 9 available for this kind of contract. It's called a "shipman." 10 It's a BIMCO form contract. 11 And the Court will see, in these exhibits, that it's 12 so standardized, there are boxes. And this is basically --13 this a fill-in-the-box contract. And it's done here by these 14 entities. 15 So circling back to the alter ego factors, the ships 16

receive business that the commercial manager goes up to get for them.

But the reason a commercial manager does that is because that's it's contractually obligated job. They're getting paid a fee to go out and find charters and even authority to execute the charter parties to find commercial business for these ships.

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So that is absolutely not evidence of a parent -either of these parent entities -- wherever they are in the corporate chain, it is not evidence of a parent providing all

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1
    the business -- the ones the subsidiaries gets. In fact, it
 2
    disproves that element of alter eqo.
 3
              Because what it does is prove that these corporate
    entities have contracted with somebody else, in an arm's length
 4
 5
    written agreement transaction, to go out and get that business.
 6
              So that's why I believe that it's correct, your
 7
    Honor, to write, "No," for Factor Number Nine, because the
    evidence actually disproves that element.
 8
              I got to move on relatively quickly here.
10
              "Does the parent use the subsidiary's property as its
11
    own?"
12
              And, here, there is no evidence or -- I think not
13
    even an allegation of that from FIMBank, your Honor.
14
              "Does the parent use the subsidiary's property as its
15
    own?"
              Here, there's absolutely no evidence that Discover
16
17
    Investment Corp. used the other entity's property, the vessel
    that's attached here in Corpus, the M/V SAM Eagle, as if it
18
19
    were its own.
20
              Likewise, there's absolutely no evidence that SPV SAM
21
    Eagle, Inc. used the NIKA as if it were its own. And there's
22
    no evidence that either of these sole private investors used
23
    the other one's property as if it were its own.
24
              So that -- the answer to question number ten is, "No,
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there's not any evidence of that."

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Instead, just the opposite is true, given this allegation from FIMBank about the sale. They like to complain about the sale of the NICA -- that Discover Investment Corp. sold the NIKA after this standstill agreement expired. Well, that's just evidence that Discover used its property, the vessel, as if it were its own. So Discover was entitled to sell the vessel if it wanted to. And it used its vessel as if it were its own. There's nothing about that -- that factor or any of these others that crosses this vertical black line that is a connection between SPV SAM Eagle and Discover. We go on to Factor Number 11, "Are the daily operations of the two corporations kept separate?" Here, there's no evidence about the daily operations of the actual owner-entities; SPV SAM Eagle or Discover Investment Corp. FIMBank falls back to that allegation about the fact that both vessels have the same commercial manager, which now is the company called SAM Panama. But, again, it's similar to what I said a few minutes There's absolutely nothing nefarious about that, having a contracted commercial manager for the vessel. It's common. Nothing about it supports a reasonable inference that the corporate entities ought to be treated as the same just

because they have both contracted with the same commercial

manager.

And if so, I'm writing "no" on that factor, because the fact that they have a common commercial manager does not meet that factor. But there's no evidence of -- there's any operations departments within the owner-entities that are -- that are the same or not kept separate.

"Does the subsidiary observe corporate formalities?"

Here, the evidence, that even FIMBank submitted,

actually supports the fact that, yes, corporate formalities are carefully observed by these companies.

They've submitted several copies of the ship mortgages, which, as I've mentioned, are simply evidence of different corporate entities entering into loan transactions with Credit Suisse Bank.

They've got additional documents, such as some pledges of stock shares. In fact, one of their documents is within this dotted line here, they've alleged that there's -- that the 100 percent owner of SPV SAM Eagle, Inc. is a company called global -- global-something.

And then its shares were pledged to a bank -- a different bank -- D-V -- DVB Bank.

And my point about that exhibit is simply that it's evidence that those two corporate entities were carefully observing corporate formalities.

And they entered into a written document to document

- 1 this pledge of shares of the corporation to a bank. 2 it's important to know that the shares were pledged to a bank, 3 not to anybody else in the corporate structure, and absolutely not to anybody across this vertical line between the two 4 5 ownership structures of these two vessels. And that's why I believe it is true -- well, it's 6 very true that there's no evidence, of this Factor Number 11, 7 that would support a reasonable inference that the corporations do not observe corporate formalities. 10 Number 13 asks whether the directors of the 11 subsidiary acted in a primary and independent interest of the 12 parent. 13 And, here, they're -- that factor is no. There is no evidence of that and there's no -- not even an allegation of 14 15 it. FIMBank has written that they've identified these 16 17 three directors of some of the Panamanian corporate entities in 18 Panama. But there's absolutely no assertion that these 19 directors did anything wrong. 20 And absolutely there's no evidence of what directors 21 of Discover Investment Corp. did. And did they do anything in 22 the primary of its parent entity? 23 It's just not there, your Honor. So they can't 24 support an inference.
 - Number 14 asks whether others paid for guaranteed

1 debts of the dominating corporation.

Here, the evidence proves just the opposite, that those same ship mortgage documents indicate that the corporate entities themselves that incurred the debt from the bank had to pay the debt back themselves.

There's not any evidence that those note is being guaranteed.

But, again, I would point out, even if there were a guarantee of loan is not a crime, it's not nefarious. And that it's -- in fact, it's common. And there's no evidence of it here.

Whether -- Factor Number 15 is whether the alleged dominator deals with the dominating corporation at arm's length.

And here I would say the ship management agreements show that arm's length transactions for the owners to deal with SAM Panama -- those are written agreements that refute this allege -- this factor, as something that would support piercing a corporate veil.

I would like to point out something about the dominator or dominee corporation at this point, your Honor.

And that's this -- which I think is a significant problem for FIMBank.

In their complaint that they used to support the attachment of this case, they very clearly alleged that the

1 company called SAM Geneva is the mastermind and the dominator 2 of both Discover and SPV SAM Eagle.

Everything is controlled by the entity called SAM Geneva. And that's what they used when they came in, presumably for an ex parte hearing, to ask this Court to attach this vessel. That was their alter ego theory, is SAM Geneva is the dominator of all the corporations.

Now, they had changed course after they got the vessel attached.

In their response pleading, they have actually acknowledged to the Court that they already knew that this entity, SAM Geneva, did not even exist in the year 2018, at the time of this grain carriage by the NICA.

Now, shifting gears, they now say that, "Oh, it's not the same Geneva entity. It must have been -- it must be the SAM Panama entity or some SAM-other entity that is the mastermind that dominates and controls these corporations."

That, I would submit, is pure speculation, your Honor. There's no evidence that SAM Panama dominates anybody.

What the evidence now shows is that they knew the allegation they asserted their theory on to begin with, could not be true because SAM Geneva did not even exist.

And we know that SAM Panama does not dominate and control because it's just -- provides contractual services under that shipman form contract.

1 So that's why I believe it is correct to write, "No," 2 for Factor Number 15, your Honor; for those reasons. Number 16 asks, does decision making for the 3 subsidiary -- "Is decision making for the subsidiary made by 4 5 the parent or its principals?" 6 Here, there's no evidence of that, your Honor, or even a supported allegation. Any decisions -- they've got 7 nothing about decision making for the SAM Eagle -- for that 8 vessel -- the SAM Eagle here. 10 There's nothing about a parent -- or, significantly, 11 there's no allegation or evidence that any of the SPV SAM Eagle 12 or any SAM entity made decision to control the vessel the NIKA. 13 Instead, the charter party for the NICA clearly shows 14 that the owner of the vessel is Discover Investment Corp. 15 And then later, as they've pointed out, Discover Investment Corp. sold its vessel. And so -- and within all 16 17 that, there's no evidence of a decision making being made by 18 the parent. 19 You got no evidence to meet this factor either, your 20 Honor, that the parent and subsidiary used the same corporate 21 office. 22 Here, I would say FIMBank devotes a lot of pages and 23 a lot of argument to addresses or trying to figure out what are 24 the addresses of these various corporations.

And I would submit that that's made purposely vague

1 by FIMBank. And that goes back to what my colleague Mr. Wray 2 said about using -- relying on these Google databases to find the addresses of corporate offices. 3 Not reliable information. But they had used it to 4 5 intentionally make it look confusing and make it look like somebody did something sneaky because these Google databases 6 7 don't show a correct address for the various entities. Here, as Mr. Saevski has pointed out in his 9 declaration and it is borne out in some of their documents; 10 like the charter party for the NIKA. 11 It's very clear. What is the corporate name and 12 where are its addresses? 13 And, in fact, FIMBank found a registered office 14 addresses for both Discover and SPV SAM Eagle and SAM Panama. 15 They've written it right into their complaint as, "Here's the 16 registered office of these entities." 17 And the charter party for the NIKA -- that is one of their exhibits -- it identifies who is the owner of the NIKA. 18 19 It expressly says, "Discover Investment Corp." And then it 20 gives its registered office address in Monrovia, Liberia. 21 And then it says, "Who is the commercial manager for 22 this vessel?" 23 It very specifically names SAM Panama, and it give the address, in Panama City, for Panama, for SAM Panama.

24

1 | vessel?"

2 It identifies Venturi. And it gives Venturi's 3 address, in Piraeus, Greece.

My point there, your Honor, is that there should not be -- there is no confusion in anybody's mind about where the office addresses are.

Instead, they've gone to great lengths to show that these databases and, in some places, the -- when addresses have changed, they've not been updated.

And, ultimately, what they're getting at is that the vessel owner entities frequently use a care-of address to have the commercial mail concerning their vessel mail care of the commercial manager, SAM Panama. And that is the same address.

So I would say, on Factor Number 17, yes, there is evidence that the owners used care of addresses, in care of the commercial manager.

I would also submit that, as an alter ego factor, having the same address or using the same corporate office is an insignificant factor that does not carry much weight.

If it did, companies like ExxonMobil would be in trouble. Or others, say, to think about how many ExxonMobil entities all use the same address in the Woodlands, would probably include a lot of -- as a matter of fact, as our replient has pointed out, FIMBank itself has multiple FIMBank entities that all have the same address for the same office in

- 1 Egypt, by the vessel the NIKA, in the year 2018.
- 2 So that's the time when it's FIMBank's burden to
- 3 | show, if they can, that they would have -- be able to pierce
- 4 | the corporate veil, under this alter ego theory, as of the year
- 5 2018, that these factors were met at that time.
- The evidence that they submitted is all over the
- 7 | place, chronologically. It goes back to 2014; I think some in
- 8 2015; some in 2016.
- 9 And I would ask the Court, when considering that
- 10 evidence and whether it -- whether it raises a reasonable
- 11 | inference of alter ego status, in 2018 -- I would ask the Court
- 12 to take that into account -- that these historical documents
- 13 | are meaningless for establishing alter ego in the year 2018.
- Here's a significant reason why it's meaningless,
- 15 | your Honor. And that's that the NIKA was acquired by Discover
- 16 Investment Corp., in the year 2016.
- 17 So some of FIMBank's argument talks about this
- 18 | vessel, when it had a former name, called the SAM Tiger, and
- 19 | its owner was a company called SPV SAM Tiger, Inc.
- 20 And that has absolutely no relevance or meaning for
- 21 trying to pierce corporate veils between Discover Investment
- 22 | Corp. and the other SAM entities.
- Discover has been the owner of that vessel since the
- 24 year 2016.
- I would also -- my other point, your Honor, would be

- that I would ask that if -- FIMBank, presumably, is going to
 talk about these factors as well, I would ask --
- I would challenge Counsel and I would ask the Court
 to ask Counsel to explain -- and not just talk in circles about
 these factors -- but to identify specific bits of evidence that
 FIMBank truly says meets any of these factors and allows one to
 draw a reasonable inference that this factor can be met by
 FIMBank, right now, today, to establish a reasonable inference
 - And, in particular, to ask whether any of the evidence -- that Counsel will talk about and that they've already asserted -- crosses this black, vertical line.

that the corporate veil should be pierced.

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- They've got lots of argument about the SAM side of this line -- and the SAM Panama and the SAM Geneva. There's lots of argument about it.
 - But none of it, your Honor, crosses this line to reach into Discover Investment Corp. or the M/V NIKA. There's not a connection between them.
 - And that's why I submit, your Honor, that FIMBank cannot meet its burden of showing why this attachment should be held in place today to deprive SPV SAM Eagle of the use of its property, the Sam Eagle.
- 23 **THE COURT:** Thank you.
- 24 MR. WRAY: Okay, your Honor --
- 25 **THE COURT:** Mister --

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 1
              MR. WRAY: We address the final part of the evidence
 2
    (indisc.).
 3
              THE COURT: Wait just a minute.
              What are you going to address?
 4
 5
                         The second part of the (indisc.).
              THE COURT: Which is -- you have five minutes.
 6
 7
              MR. WRAY: Sure.
                                I'll be very brief.
              Not only does FIMBank have to address (indisc.) alter
 8
 9
    ego, they have to show it was used for fraud.
10
              The only fraud they point to is a document that was
11
    collateral for loan arbitration, saying, "Discover, don't sell
12
    your vessels until June -- before June 21, 2019."
13
              Discover sold their vessel on June 24th.
14
              THE COURT: I understand that.
15
                         They adhered to the terms of the
    agreement. There's no evidence of fraud.
16
17
              THE COURT: I understand that. I understand that.
18
              MR. WRAY:
                         (Indisc.) establish (indisc.) alter eqo
19
              Without the fraud, they have nothing.
    factors.
20
              THE COURT: All right.
21
              Mr. Floyd, are you going to --
22
              MR. FLOYD: Absolutely, your Honor. And I will try
23
    to be as brief as possible here. Just got my notes down there.
24
              And I thought, a good spot to start -- because Mr.
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    Hart spoke an awful lot about the ship management agreement.
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That's

And it is a standard form, prepared by BIMCO, which is a maritime organization, while regarding everything. they publish an awful lot of standard forms, for everything from charter parties, voyage charters, time charters, salvage agreements -- all sorts of standard forms. Standard forms are pretty common in the maritime industry. And then bulk them on up with the rider clauses. But Docket Number 27 tack 3 -- and I'm looking at page 8 of 81, in that entry. Big entry is Mr. Saevski's declaration. And I'm looking at the shipman agreement between Discover and SAM Shipping Management S.A. There's a really interesting thing that I think goes to an awful lot of the 19 or so non-exclusive factors that Mr. Hart just pointed to. If you go to Box 22, of the shipman agreement -- Box 22 and 23 -- those are the notice clause provisions, saying, "To whom does notice go by one party to the agreement when it has something to tell to the other party to the agreement?" So here, meaning, if Discover needs to say some to SAM Shipping Management or SAM Shipping Management needs to say something to Discover, where does that communication go? Box 22: Really interesting. Notices to Discover Investment Corp., they go care of SAM Shipping Management S.A. and care of Venturi Fleet Management S.A.

They don't go to Discover Investment Corp.

- 1 | because Discover Investment Corp., by all indications presently
- 2 known, is a Liberian entity with -- I don't even need to look
- 3 | at this -- it's registered address at 80 Broad Street,
- 4 Monrovia, Liberia, just like tens of thousands of other single-
- 5 asset vessel owning companies.
- 6 80 Broad Street, Monrovia, Liberia. I'm sure every
- 7 | shipping attorney in the room here has written that address
- 8 several hundred times in their careers.
- 9 So communications go to the manager, even if they're
- 10 | coming from the manager, makes one logically wonder, "What is
- 11 | the real purpose, if any, of Discover, other than serving as a
- 12 | shell to be the registered owner of a vessel that can then be
- easily transferred when there's claims against the vessel?"
- 14 That was point of theirs. Another cleanup topic --
- 15 and, certainly, I'll walk on through, briefly, the 19 points or
- 16 so. And I've summarized my views on those.
- 17 But a common (indisc.) was made, saying that FIMBank
- 18 or its attorneys filed this complaint and somehow knew that SAM
- 19 | Shipping Asset Management, in Geneva -- which I now refer to
- 20 as, "Old Sam; Old Sam Geneva" -- that it had been -- had its
- 21 name changed to company, General du Maritime le Commerce S.A.
- 22 And then company a Maritime -- or whatever it's
- 23 | called in French -- went into liquidation.
- But, magically, a new company, also called Shipping
- 25 Asset Management, paren, SAM, close paren, S.A., was created

1 | shortly before that, in Panama.

And so it just sprung right back into existence. I personally feel zero guilt for not having seen that. It's rather confusing to catch it.

And I think it was a late night, around midnight -well after the complaint had been filed and well after my
adversaries had filed their motion to vacate the attachment -flipping around and saw, wow, there's another company with
precisely the same name, located in Panama. What's the story
here? What's going on? Why would anybody do that?

And then you dig a bit deeper, and you look at mortgages -- and these are all in the declaration of Mr.

Zadkovich, which we put it in opposition -- you look at mortgages and there is a mortgage, from 2016 -- the mortgage-related document. I forget whether it's an amendment or the first mortgage or something else.

But there's a document, from late-2016. So about a year after the name -- name change, and after the liquidation in Switzerland, where Mr. Saevski signs off on that mortgage document.

And what's contained in the address information being given to the bank, which was Credit Suisse, for notice to go to the mortgagor, says SAM -- or Shipping Asset Management, SAM, S.A., on route to somebody in Geneva, Switzerland. It's the old company no longer existing.

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              So, look, I fell for it; the bank fell for that; Mr.
 2
    Saevski doesn't say anything in his declaration here about
 3
    that -- certainly that he would sign off on that makes me
    wonder about his declaration and a point of discovery that I
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 5
    would certainly hope to take and I'll go anywhere to get that
    done -- would be to take a deposition of Mr. Saevski.
 6
 7
              But that's a very interesting factor right there.
    I've never heard of a company that changes its name,
 8
    liquidates, but has a doppelganger in another country, ready to
10
    step into their shoes and be used as notice address for the
11
    bank, in a mortgage, surprising.
12
              I would -- continuing to move on -- gentlemen, would
13
    you mind if I moved to this mic?
14
              MR. SPEAKER: Fine with me. It's all right.
15
              MR. FLOYD: Andy, could you give me a hand?
16
              MR. NASH:
                         Yeah.
17
              MR. FLOYD: That would be great. Thank you.
18
              Moving on through these quickly, I know -- and not
19
    surprisingly -- the attorneys -- Counsel for SAM Eagle -- SPV
20
    SAM Eagle have said no on each of these.
21
              I think that we would say yes on nearly every single
22
    one. And on a few, it might be, you know, to be determined
23
    during discovery; just be realistic there.
24
              But, "Is there common stock ownership?
25
              Well, these are all, as we can tell, closely held
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companies. They're not publicly traded. They're not owned by even five or six different companies being involved.

There's going to be single owners all the way up the chain, until you get that ultimate beneficial owner, at the very top.

But the fact that, as shown in Exhibit L, to Mr.

Zadkovich's declaration -- the fact that Steamship Mutual issued renewal numbers for two years in a row, for the vessels in the SAM Shipping fleet, and those renewal numbers were sequential when it went to SAM-animal-this, SAM-animal-that, SAM-animal-bird, NIKA, and then some other ships -- in fact, to the SAM-animals, they were sequential.

And we (indisc.), supporting the maritime industry, we have a good understanding of how P&I Clubs work, sequential numbers would not get issued unless those vessel-owning entities under the same beneficial ownership.

Likewise, even after the former SAM TIGER became known as the NIKA -- now it's known as the NORD -- still prominently emblazing painted on its hull, and sailing around the world for a good number of years -- was SAM Shipping, in big, big letters.

I'm quite certain that discovery would show that there is common stock ownership at the UBO -- ultimate beneficial ownership level -- amongst all these entities, and certainly including in SPV SAM Eagle and Discover.

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With that said, the reality is ships -- part of the
assets. Nobody has come forward and identified a single
employee or a single operating address of any of these vessel
owning companies.
          There is registered addresses. There's 80 Broad
Street, over in Monrovia; and there's an address at High Tech
Tower, in Panama City.
          But those are -- 80 Broad Street is where the
Liberian corporate registry is located. That's its
headquarters. And the High Tech Tower address is a law firm,
Ballard and Ballard, in Panama City.
          I don't think anybody's actually chartering ships --
I can say, with certainty, regarding 80 Broad Street. And I
don't think that's happening in High Tech either.
          I won't go through and change any of these, where it
says no or yes or anything like that.
          The common stock ownership, likewise, somewhere down
there, there was the issue of addresses.
          Common directors and officers: These types of
companies -- which are closely held companies set up in
offshore jurisdictions to own single assets -- have nominee
directors and nominee officers.
          The real question there is, "Who are the employees?
Who is running things day to day?"
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That commonality is

And there is commonality there.

- 1 | the shipping management company. It does it for all of them.
- 2 And that's not even in dispute.
- Whether it's old SAM Geneva, new SAM Geneva, or SAM
- 4 | Panama, it's the same management company. And now, on the
- 5 technical management side, there's deals with (indisc.) and
- 6 other issues like that.
- 7 You have Venturi, in Greece and Piraeus, which does
- 8 | it for all of them. That's the director, that's the employee.
- 9 It's the SAM Shipping Management company -- whatever, besides
- 10 names being used at a given time.
- 11 Same thing goes for common business departments.
- 12 They don't have an accounting department.
- 13 I'll be amazed -- surprise me during discovery -- if
- 14 Discover Investment Corp. or SPV SAM Eagle have an accounting
- 15 department and an accounts receivable department, a voyage
- 16 | chartering department, a time charter -- they're not going to
- 17 have it.
- 18 It's because everything -- all of those functions are
- 19 performed by the management company, be it the commercial
- 20 management company or the technical management company -- both
- 21 of which are now being run from the same address in Piraeus,
- 22 Greece.
- Consolidated financial statements: I don't know the
- 24 answer to that.
- I also would be really surprised if anyone could

- track down a financial statement, other than what's internal to group, and probably maintained by shipping manage -- the
- 3 shipping management company.
- Does the parent finance itself: What we put in, in
- 5 supporting documentation, as well as, as I recall, reference in
- 6 | the complaint, is that there had been a good deal of cross-
- 7 | financing -- of fleet financing within this group over the
- 8 years.
- 9 What I mean by, "cross-financing," is that, an
- 10 ultimate beneficial owner whose single-asset companies have one
- 11 | ship each -- Ship X, Ship Y, and Ship Z -- it goes to the bank
- 12 and says, "Bank, I will pledge, I will mortgage, I will do
- 13 this, with respect to each, X, Y, and Z, in order to get the
- 14 | funds from you to update those ships and go purchase a new
- 15 | vessel..." -- should have started earlier in the alphabet --
- 16 | "...I'm going to go purchase Ship A as well."
- 17 That's cross-financing. There's evidence of that
- 18 here. That's the same (indisc.) financing the subsidiary.
- 19 Because the parent is using its assets, regardless of precise
- 20 entity denomination for ownership in order to fund overall
- 21 operation and growth.
- 22 "Did the parent cause the incorporation of the
- 23 subsidiary?"
- I've read that a million times, and I never really
- 25 understand what it means. Because, in my mind, the parent

- 1 company always cause incorporation of the subsidiary. So I'll 2 take a pass on that one. I just don't understand it.
- 3 "Is the subsidiary operated with grossly inadequate 4 capital?"
 - Obviously, with an awful lot of these factors, as the Plaintiff here bring the claims against a group of closely-held corporations and the rather murky-sometimes world of maritime commerce, we're on the outside, looking in.
 - And there is always going to be a degree of informed speculation. And it is informed, of course, by experience in the maritime industry.
- But what do we know right now regarding Discover

 13 Investment Corp.?
 - Well, a few days after the cessation of the standstill agreement -- which Discover entered into with FIMBank, in order to forestall any attempts to arrest or attach, not just the NIKA, but other ships in the same or associated ownership, management, or control, very important, meaning the fleet.
 - Just after that protective agreement to protect the whole fleet expired, Discover sold the NIKA to a company which had been established -- I think it was April 24 of the same year, a few weeks before -- a few weeks after the standstill agreement -- and nobody's ever heard it before -- called, Anchor Nautical Inc., another Liberian entity.

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I haven't been able to find out anything about
Anchor. Who owns it? Where does it have offices? Anything
like that. Very, very mysterious company, created after the
standstill agreement was entered into.
          And then it purchased the sole asset of Discover a
few days after the standstill agreement expired.
          Well, you sell a ship. Ships are worth a good deal
of money most of the time. Generally, one expects some cash to
flow from that.
          But so far, over in England, where there's a freezing
injunction proceeding going on, and related considerations,
Discover has not shown up to post any cash to have the
freezer -- the freezing injunction against it released.
          It's surprising for a company that should be cash
rich prolong the sale of its sole asset.
          So I think that one there is certainly supported with
a reasonable inference.
          I'll try to move through this, your Honor.
          "Does the parent pay salaries and expenses of the
subsidiary?"
          Again, it goes back to the same point throughout all
of this.
          We're dealing with the maritime industry, with
closely held companies that are operated by that same shared
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commercial manager and same shared technical manager.

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Those managers are the personnel; they're the
officers, directors, employees. They're everything. The only
other person you can find is the ultimate beneficial owner.
          So, yes, the same people are getting paid by those
same other persons.
          "Does the subsidiary receive no business except that
given by the parent?"
          I think it's on page 10, of SAM Eagle's opposition
brief, where they basically acknowledge that.
          I won't delay things looking on through my notes.
But what they said in their brief is that, that's the norm, or
course. That's what a management company is there for, and so
there's nothing surprising or nefarious about getting business
from a management company.
          Well, that may be the case. But as of so many of
these things, when the management company does everything for
the business that's located at 80 Broad Street, Monrovia,
Liberia, one starts to wonder.
          Your Honor, I don't want to drive anyone nuts here,
going on through. I'll be more than happy to go through each
of these, or if there's other proceedings, I can hit on some --
highlight any of the key ones the Court's interested in.
          THE COURT: This is your hearing. You tell me what
you think is important.
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Thank you, your Honor.

I'll keep going

MR. FLOYD:

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And the funny thing about it was, the Singaporean
notary identified Mr. Magee as being the authorized
representative, not for SPV SAM Eagle, but for SPV SAM Tiger,
former owner of the NIKA, just shows -- go to show how close
everything is amongst this -- with companies and this fleet.
          "Were the directors of the subsidiary act in a
primary and independent interest of the parent?"
          I think that's certainly the case when you have a
vessel manager running an entire fleet of ships, and nobody
knows who the single asset vessel owning companies really are,
other than a bunch of names at registered addresses, I don't
think anyone's really doing things for them.
          "Payment or guarantee of debts of the dominating
corporation."
          In our declaration, in opposition to the (indisc.)
motion, a number of the mortgage-related documents concern the
pledge of assets or the pledge of sale - pledge of shares comes
to mind -- by companies sitting up at the top of the group.
          Two companies there are called, Dry Bulk Global
Limited and Dry Bulk Maritime Limited -- pledged their shares.
This was over in Hong Kong -- in a number of the SPV SAM
companies.
          Likewise, there's the cross-financing of the ships.
So the Ship A is used to finance the purchase of Ship B.
                                                          That
is throughout the group.
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"Whether the alleged dominator deals with the dominating corporation at arm's length."

I won't go back again to the shipman agreement. But that certainly underscores that there.

Additionally, though, FIMBank's complaint has made allegations that two vessel sales were sham sales. That would be the sale by SPV SAM Tiger -- of the Tiger -- to Discover Investment Corp., where it became the NIKA.

And then, on the back end, much more recently, the sale of the NIKA, from Discover, to Anchor Nautical, when it became the NORD, were both sham sales; not arm's length sales.

And, in support of that, there's the declaration of Mr. Pagonis that's been submitted. He's a consultant in the maritime industry. And he took a look at information concerning trade patterns and where these ships sail, whether or not there was marketing for the vessel.

You know, if you want to sell your house, you want to sell a boat, something like that, you market it. You go out into the market, you let brokers and other people know that you're looking for a buyer so you get the highest possible price. He saw no indication of that.

And, likewise, quite notably, with respect to both of those sales -- the earlier one when it became the NIKA and the late one when it became the NORD -- Steamship Mutual remained in P&I Club -- all of which indicate that it stayed within the

1 same family.

2 Generally, when a ship changes ownership, truly

3 changes ownership, the new owners would move to their preferred

4 P&I Club. And, certainly, the sequencing of renewal numbers

5 | will not stay, 1, 2, 3, 4. If they do stay with the same club,

6 maybe it'll be 1, 2, 3, 26.

7 Same corporate office. We haven't seen any corporate

8 office so far, other than the offices of the various SAM

9 | Shipping Management companies or Shipping Asset Management SAM

10 companies, be they in Geneva or in Greece -- wherever they want

to bounce around to -- at the office. There are shared

12 offices.

11

That also is a, "Yes."

"Common business deposits."

15 Financial information is confidential at this stage.

16 And we would most certainly need discovery to identify the

17 banking relationships. That's one of the points that I

18 | identified earlier on here.

19 And 19, Did the parent company exist solely as a

20 holding company for its subsidiaries:

21 That goes to who is the ultimate beneficial owner.

22 We're not really talking about a -- well, it goes at two

23 levels.

24 If one views the shipping management companies as

25 being the parent, then it is both -- it's running those assets

1 and controlling them for the ultimate beneficial owner.

I would expect that the ultimate beneficial owner is not a holding company, but an individual. But even holding companies have individuals sitting behind if you break through the trust and find out who it is.

Your Honor, that's running on through those questions there. And then I know, at the very end there, Mr. Wray had brought up that there's the additional prong to an alter ego analysis of not just showing enough sufficient commonalities amongst the group, but also proper allegations of the corporate form being abused to do some wrong.

And to be clear, cases again and again and again have said that fraud -- actual fraud is not required. It's that the language, in White Rosebay, I think was -- I think it was just wrongdoing. But fraud or other wrongdoing is commonly said.

But we point to here would be the standstill agreement. Quite clearly in -- I think it was April -- whenever it was -- late March of 2019, when Discover and FIMBank entered into their so-called standstill agreement.

FIMBank agreed that it would not pursue arrest or attachment of any ships in -- of the NIKA or of any ships in the same or associated ownership management or control.

It complied with that bargain.

But, low and behold, during the course of that standstill agreement, Anchor Nautical was established down in

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    Liberia.
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              And as soon as the agreement came to its end, the so-
    called --
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              THE COURT:
                         So how does that end up being fraud?
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              MR. FLOYD: Your Honor, it doesn't need to be fraud.
 6
    Other wrongdoing --
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                         Why is it wrongdoing --
              THE COURT:
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              MR. FLOYD:
                         -- is sufficient.
 9
              THE COURT: -- if they create a company that -- if
10
    somebody creates a company and then, after the agreement has
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    completely expired, they sell their vessel to that entity?
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              MR. FLOYD: To an entity within the same family, I
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    think that that is wrongful because it's misleading to the
14
    world. If --
              THE COURT: Okay, I need to take a break. I've got
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    to sign a search warrant. And then, when we come back, I'm
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    going to give both sides ten minutes, period.
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              You make all your arguments then.
              THE MARSHAL: All rise.
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         (Court is in recess from 4:17 to 4:32 p.m.)
21
              THE COURT: All right. We're back on the record on
    the FIMBank case, 19-cv-264.
22
23
              Do you want to finish up?
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              MR. FLOYD: Yes, your Honor. I can finish off in one
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             My -- the last comment that I was on there the Court
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had asked about the transfer of the NIKA from Discover to anchor, and on that point, in our brief from the White Rosebud -- the White Rosebay case, we cited page six of that argument, a quotation from that, that all that's required -it's not fraud, but all that's required is an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness, and that case also noted that the shifting of assets could be an indicia of abuse of the corporate form. That's what we're getting at here, your Honor. The concern, the fundamental concern, is that Discover sold its sole asset, proceeds would ordinarily flow from such a sale, but the appearances do seem to be that Discover is not exactly cash rich at the moment and perhaps without assets, and that that transfer has been from a known entity within the same group, apparently to what was an unknown entity within the group. And I would also disagree; I know there were comments beforehand that one can go and arrest a ship anywhere around the world. It's not nearly that easy. Ships can run. a ship around the world, they're peripatetic assets. You need to find it; then you also have to comply with the local law where you find it. And that law varies greatly. So, it's not as easy as one might say. On top of all of that, even if there were a possibility of seizing the NIKA or now the NORD someplace else in the world, it has zero bearing legally on this proceeding here now. Your Honor, those were all the comments that I had in

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1 rebuttal there. I can certainly sum up when the Court would 2 like.
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- 3 THE COURT: Mr. Ray? No, Mr. --
- 4 MR. HART: Your Honor --

remarks.

- **THE COURT:** Mr. Hart, right?
- MR. HART: Yes. Yes, your Honor. Mr. Hart speaking.

 I would like to make three points that I intend to and believe

 I can make them briefly; three points in response to counsel's
 - First, in counsel's argument just now to the last bit, particularly regarding the alter ego factors and the two posters that counsel just went through, I would like to point out that none of those arguments and none of that evidence crossed this black vertical line on our chart to connect Discover Investment Corporation. I was listening carefully for it, and I heard none --
 - THE COURT: I don't think -- I think you would agree that it didn't, but I think what he mentioned earlier was that's what he needs the discovery for. You have -- is that right?
 - MR. FLOYD: Yes, your Honor. It's -- there's potential cross with respect to the management company, but ultimately with -- what matters is what's not shown on that chart, who sits above the two sole private investors. That's where that TB (indisc.) --

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              THE COURT:
                         That's what you're talking about in terms
 2
    of the beneficial owner.
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              MR. FLOYD: Yes, your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.
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              MR. HART:
                         In terms of the alter ego analysis, your
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    Honor, I'm simply pointing out that none of the evidence or
 7
    arguments establishes or allows one to draw a reasonable
 8
    inference today that there is a connection to Discover
 9
    Investment Corp., that the corporate form -- that any of
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    these -- this evidence was used to abuse the corporate form of
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    Discover Investment Corp. --
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              THE COURT: Okay. Now --
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              MR. HART: -- it's simply not there.
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                         -- you said something a minute ago about
              THE COURT:
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    it's too late to order discovery because we're in this hearing
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          Tell me exactly what you were talking about.
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              MR. HART: I'm talking about the fact that in this --
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    to attach property under Rule (b) is not intended to be --
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    under the Admiralty Rules, the Federal Rules of Civil
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    Procedure, is not intended to be a procedural tool that opens
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    the door to discovery. It's instead -- Rule (b) itself, the
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    attachment of property, is an extraordinary remedy.
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              THE COURT: I understand that.
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                         And, then, so it requires a heightened
              MR. HART:
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It's not open-ended discovery.

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standard.

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              And the second point is that the alter ego, veil
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    piercing theory, is itself, as the case law says, an
    exceptional remedy; exceptional thing to do.
 3
                          Uh-huh.
              THE COURT:
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              MR. HART: And it's not the rule, it's not the norm;
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    it's an exception.
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              THE COURT: But are you telling me that I cannot
    order discovery on this issue if it appears that discovery
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    would be warranted?
              MR. HART: Not at all. Not at all. That's not what
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    I'm suggesting, your Honor.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
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              MR. HART: Certainly we understand the Court has the
    authority and the discretion to order discovery. What I am
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    doing and what we are doing is asking that the Court not allow
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    that discovery for these reasons.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
              MR. HART: But -- for all those reasons.
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              THE COURT: I understand.
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              MR. HART: But that if that discovery is allowed,
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    then we'll -- then we would very much ask the Court to require
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    FIMBank to deposit the money to cover these custodial expenses
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    to hold the vessel in custody while they conduct their
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    discovery, which essentially would be a fishing expedition for
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    them to try to find out what if they might find some
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information about Discover.

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I'd also like to point out that -- I don't want to forget this point, your Honor, which I think is an important one. So much, in fact, nearly all, of their alter ego theory relies on the fact that there is a common commercial manager for the two vessels.

THE COURT: I heard the argument about that. I don't need it repeated. Was there something else you wanted to say?

MR. HART: I just wanted to point out how that's so much like -- it's not unlike an office building management contract, a company like CBRE that manages lots of office buildings, and there's a building management agreement with CBRE, and CBRE conducts all the business of that building, goes out and gets tenants, collects rents, sign leases, and they maintain the building, they pay all the expenses for the building. They are required to go and deal with the insurance for the building. They, basically -- CBRE runs all the business of the building. CBRE also does that for lots of other buildings. And each of the -- many of the buildings are owned by different owners. So, the fact that lots of different buildings and lots of different real property owners contract with CBRE to manage their asset, that does not mean that all those owners are alter egos of each other --

THE COURT: But how did they all get the name SAM?

MR. HART: -- or that the building --

1 | following that sale, that's probably coming from the photograph

2 that shows a vessel that has NIKA up on its bow and then in

3 great big letters says SAM Shipping along the hull there.

4 That's one of the exhibits; I think it's -- well, it's one of

5 | the exhibits in our brief. I can certainly look it up if of

6 interest.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FLOYD: Regarding the analogy to CBRE and real estate management companies, I think there is a huge difference there, which is that, generally, so far, with technology, a building stays in the same place. And, so, if you slip and fall at a building or building breaches a contract, flooding in an office space, whatever it may be, the building's there. Shipping is a bit different because ships sail around the world, change the names, change their ownership companies; a very, very difficult-to-follow industry sometimes.

Additionally, as to the proposition that FIMBank should have to deposit some sum of money, we are -- FIMBank is already making routine payments to the U.S. Marshals Service, which is maintaining the custody of the vessel pursuant to this Court's order. We are making that -- in fact, it's \$10,000 every eight days that's being paid by FIMBank, and that's, you know, a substantial sum of money there. I am unaware of any proposition in the rules, in the supplemental rules, that says some additional sum beyond what the marshal has asked for and

- 1 | instructed, which is the 10,000, needs to be paid. It sounds
- 2 to me like SAM Eagle is looking for some sort of -- can't even
- 3 | call it counter security, because counter security wouldn't be
- 4 available here, but some sort of leverage to make life
- 5 difficult for FIMBank, tougher than it already has been after
- 6 being out of pocket \$5 million or so.
- 7 THE COURT: What were you talking about, Mr. Hart, if
- 8 | they're already paying for it?
- 9 MR. HART: There's -- actually, Mr. Buchanan, if you
- 10 don't mind, could address that. He's got the expenses that
- 11 | have been incurred here in this port while the vessel's been
- 12 under custody. It's not only what the marshal is charging for
- 13 | security on the ship; there's been lots of other --
- 14 THE COURT: Okay. Just a minute, Mr. Buchanan.
- 15 Did you finish?
- 16 MR. FLOYD: I had not, your Honor. I can finish up
- 17 | very quickly, but why doesn't Mr. Buchanan go. I wasn't clear,
- 18 though, what Mr. Buchanan states on to the ports?? were for.
- 19 MR. HART: SPV SAM Eagle.
- 20 MR. FLOYD: Okay; because there was a reference there
- 21 to the port, too, that that confused me. It was for the
- 22 dockage. Well, sir, why don't you go ahead, please.
- 23 MR. SPEAKER: Okay. Thank you.
- MR. BUCHANAN: Your Honor, in addition to what the
- 25 marshal is charging, there are custodia legis expenses that

- 1 dock to another and then shifted to offshore. And anticipated 2 probably another as much as \$70,000 in expense for fuel for the ship and for transportation by a launch to return the ship's 3 certificates to it. So if the court is contemplating allowing 4 discovery, SPV SAM Eagle, Inc. would request the court 5 6 condition that discovery on FIMBank depositing another \$250,000 7 in the -- with the marshal to cover the expenses for 8 maintaining the vessel while it's under this court's custody. 9 MR. FLOYD: Your Honor, I'll just note that that is 10 the subject of a separate motion. It's already pending, I don't think fully briefed at this point. Those issues that 11 12 we'll debrief in connection with that, including the fact that 13 there was another arrest. There was an arresting party for a 14 substantial chunk of time at the front end of this special --15 **THE COURT:** Has that been resolved? The arresting 16 party at the front end? 17 MR. HART: I understand it was revolved, your Honor. I don't know much about it but I believe --18 19 **THE COURT:** Like a measly few thousand dollars 20 compared to this one, right? 21 MR. BUCHANNAN: It was almost immediately resolved, 22 your Honor, the amount in dispute --THE COURT: I thought it would be.
- 23
- 24 MR. BUCHANNAN: The amount in dispute was paid and 25 the vessel was released within a day or two.

1 MR. HART: And as I understand it, it concerned a 2 maritime lien against this vessel, the Sam Eagle vessel.

MR. BUCHANNAN: That's correct.

MR. HART: It was not a --

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THE COURT: Right, right, that's right because I was the one that signed the papers on that. I do remember and that's why I was so concerned when we started talking about the whole alter ego thing. Okay. Go ahead, Mister --

MR. FLOYD: Your Honor, I just wanted to note that that's separate pending motion out there.

Overarching comment from me, consideration is that the burden -- and it's pretty clear. The burden on FIMBbank at this state at the stage of an E4F fakitor (phonetic) motion is to demonstrate that the information available, be it in the complaint or in supporting documents, supports a reasonable inference that it has its claim against the defendant. And I think that that has been satisfied here. Even if there's any doubt as to whether or not we've reached that reasonable inference support level, I think we've certainly gotten to the level that discovery, limited expedited discovery is warranted. We'd look for ownership information; we'd look for information about what, if any, personnel these various companies have other than the management company. We'd look for banking information to see the answer to that deposit thing, the ultimate beneficial owner. Insurance. And where the proceeds

1 | went from the sale of the NIKA as well as some basic

2 | information regarding chartering in and chartering out

3 | practices. But I think we've satisfied that burden, your

4 Honor, and certainly gotten over the hurdle of being that

5 discovery is warranted to get to the bottom of this.

Thank you, your Honor.

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THE COURT: Okay. The problem is that as far as both sides are concerned, there is no good news and there's no good And then there's more no good news. Because if the fees are as Mr. Buchanan says, then at some point, fairly soon, the value of the vessel is going to be exceeded. And I'm not the one who decided how these cases are supposed to be handled. But Judge Ramos assigned this case to me and as I'm sure all of you understand, there are going to be these inevitable delays that are going to involve my preparing a recommendation to her, even though I know it's a warrant of arrest. But to quash a warrant to arrest, it's got to be done by M&R. And then Judge Ramos has to make a decision about what to do and none of that -- and it might be at the end. Let's just say I don't order discovery. It might be at the end of that period that she orders discovery or she has a hearing or she decides to do that prior to making any kind of a ruling on any recommendation that I'm making. I'm just pointing out the realities of how this works and how it's set up and I can't make dispositive decisions on this case so

And then to make matters worse for all of you, I'm retiring at the end of the year and there will be somebody new taking my place. And she will automatically be substituted in for anything that's going on. So that's another person who's going to have to get up to speed on the case.

My suggestion is -- I don't know if you can work this out but it's going to -- just inevitably, it's going to take some more time before this very basic decision is made. And I'm not saying that -- I'm not trying to make a threat or anything like that but sometimes I think that when the lawyers come here, they don't really understand the realities of what's going to happen when you have all these people. This is like more than one person involved in making the decisions in this case. So I just wanted to point that out.

I will do my best to get something out very soon. I would -- I have to tell you, I don't know what I'm going to -- what kind of a decision I'm going to make. If you want time to file post-hearing briefs, that's fine with me but you've got to understand what all the realities are and how long it's going to take for all this to eventually be decided. So I don't know if any side feels like they need time to file additional briefs. But it seems to me that when you have these foreign entities involved, these foreign shipping companies, foreign owners, a different way of -- different companies that have a different way of handling assets and corporate minutes and

1 corporate partnerships and eventual owners and beneficial 2 owners and that kind of thing, but you can't tell someone who 3 makes a showing that maybe there is something to this, that they can't go and do some limited discovery. If limited 4 5 discovery is ordered, what kind of time are you talking about 6 needing? 7 MR. FLOYD: Judge, I think we can move very quickly. If we were authorized to proceed with discovery today -- and I'd be happy to consult with counsel on this and come back with 10 an answer quickly -- I think we could have everything --11 Christmas might be too quick but I'd shoot for Christmas time, 12 New Years. We'd have to have expedited responses to document 13 demands and things like that and get a deposition --14 **THE COURT:** But if that involves deposing people in 15 foreign countries, how do you do that expedited and how do you 16 do it at Christmas time? 17 MR. FLOYD: If everybody works together. I flew --18 I've flown multiple times in the past week; I'm sure counsel 19 has as well. You get where you need to be and sometimes family 20 gets to see you at Christmas. It happened two years ago for 21 We can make it happen quickly, your Honor. 22 **THE COURT:** Okay. 23 MR. HART: We would -- if that discovery were being 24 allowed, we would prefer to compress it into 30 days and get

If they want a

all the discovery completed in 30 days.

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1 deposition, if they want documents, we would propound discovery 2 requests also. We can envision they can -- deposing their witness or witnesses as well, and should be in time to get 3 documents from them as well. If that were going to happen, 4 5 your Honor. And we would want to aim for getting that all 6 completed within 30 days. I understand that's a tall order, 7 call for a lot of work but to all this ship under attachment 8 while they conduct discovery is a tall order. It's a big deal. 9 THE COURT: I understand that. I understand it's 10 touch and it's tough on both sides. 11 Mr. Floyd, can you do it in 30 days? MR. FLOYD: What is today, the 13th? I think to get 12 13 things just up and running, I'd look for -- if we're at a 14 point, your Honor, where we could all agree to limited scope discovery on an expedited basis and not monkeying around with 15 16 any unreasonable responses to documents (indisc.) and things 17 like that and a witness was going to be made available, I'd say 18 I would propose five weeks respectfully. It's a little bit over 30 days but 35, 36. If that's what it takes then get that 19 20 done. 21 THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to do this then. 22 Because I understand that the defendant is not 23 agreeing that discovery should take place but if the two of you 24 agree, the two of you agree on a period of time of five weeks

or whatever it is that you agree to, you could just -- all you

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(Laughter)

CERTIF	ICATION
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I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

Join 1 Vilan

December 12, 2019

Signed

Dated

TONI HUDSON, TRANSCRIBER